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In social anxiety the psychological self is closely related to the feared stimulus. Socially anxious
individuals are, by definition, concerned about how the self is perceived and evaluated by others. As
autobiographical memory is strongly related to views of the self it follows that biases in autobiographical
memory play an important role in social anxiety. In the present study high (n = 19) and low (n = 29)
socially anxious individuals were compared on autobiographical memory bias, current goals, and self-
discrepancy. Individuals high in social anxiety showed a bias towards recalling more negative and more
social anxiety-related autobiographical memories, reported more current goals related to overcoming
social anxiety, and showed larger self-discrepancies. The pattern of results is largely in line with earlier
research in individuals with PTSD and complicated grief. This suggests that the relation between
autobiographical memory bias and the self is a potentially valuable trans-diagnostic factor.
Keywords: Social anxiety; Autobiographical memory; Memory bias; Anxiety disorders; Cognitive bias.
Memory biases are proposed to play an important
role in maintaining social anxiety. Clark and Wells
(1995) suggest that people with social anxiety are
more prone to recall memories of negative social
experiences that support their negative self-image.
Similarly, Rapee and Heimberg (1997) propose
that perceived performance in social situations is
at least partially based on the retrieval of autobio-
graphical memories of negative performance in
socially anxious individuals. Interestingly, research
into explicit and implicit memory biases for soci-
ally threatening cues has yielded few robust find-
ings so far (see Morgan, 2010, for a recent review).
It has been suggested that biases in autobiograph-
ical memory might be more important in social
anxiety than biases for social anxiety-related labor-
atory stimuli (Morgan, 2010). However, empirical
studies on autobiographical memory bias in social
anxiety are currently lacking (Morgan, 2010). The
present study aimed to contribute to this emerging
literature by focusing on autobiographical memory
bias in relation to the self construct in the context
of social anxiety.
The Self-Memory System (SMS) model of
autobiographical memory (Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000; Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004)
has been cited repeatedly in relation to biases in
autobiographical memory related to psychopatho-
logy (e.g. Sutherland & Bryant, 2005, for PTSD;
Morgan, 2010, for social anxiety). This model is
not linked to any specific disorder, and so it
provides a framework for understanding the rela-
tion between the self and memory from a trans-
diagnostic perspective. According to the SMS
model, the encoding and retrieval of autobio-
graphical memories is guided by the “working
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self”. The working self is a complex hierarchy of
goals and self-images that guides the retrieval of
autobiographical memories in relation to the “long-
term self”. The long-term self includes autobio-
graphical knowledge from past experiences which
is organised according to themes or time-periods
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway et al.,
2004). The SMS model predicts that retrieval of
autobiographical memories is dependent on cur-
rently active goals and self-images in the working
self shaped by the long-term self. This prediction is
especially relevant to social anxiety because the
main characteristic of the disorder is a fear of
negative evaluation of the self by other social
agents (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).
This part of the SMS model has not yet been
tested in social anxiety but has received initial
support from studies focusing on post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD). Sutherland and Bryant
(2005) tested the relationship between self-defining
memories and trauma-related goals. Participants
were people with PTSD, trauma-exposed non-
PTSD, or non-trauma-exposed control participants.
Participants retrieved self-defining memories and
listed goals that were most important for them at
that time. PTSD participants reported more neg-
ative self-defining memories than non-PTSD and
control participants, and fewer positive memories
than non-PTSD participants. Interestingly, they
also reported more trauma-related defining mem-
ories than participants who had experienced a
trauma but did not develop PTSD. In a regression
analysis including depression, anxiety, intrusive
memories, avoidance, and trauma-related goals,
only the latter uniquely predicted the retrieval of
trauma-related self-defining memories.
Sutherland and Bryant (2008) subsequently
investigated cued recall from autobiographical
memory in traumatised participants with and
without PTSD. Participants retrieved specific auto-
biographical memories in response to positive and
negative cue words. Participants further completed
a measure of self-discrepancy based on three self-
images as defined by Higgins (1987): the Actual
self (the current view of the self), the Ideal self
(how one would like to be), and the Ought self
(what one should be like). Participants with PTSD
retrieved more trauma-related memories overall
than participants in the non-PTSD group. The
PTSD group also showed greater discrepancies
between the Actual self and the Ideal and Ought
self compared to the non-PTSD group. Discrepan-
cies between the Ideal and Actual self were highly
correlated with the number of trauma-related
memories that were retrieved in response to
positive cue words. Comparable findings have
been reported in the context of complicated grief
(a proposed psychological disorder in which
bereavement takes a chronic form), such that the
condition is linked to personal memories domi-
nated by the loss (Maccallum & Bryant, 2008) and
that loss-related goals are linked to memories of
the deceased (Maccallum & Bryant, 2010).
The findings from these studies support a link
between autobiographical memory organisation
and the self related to aversive events in indivi-
duals chronically affected by the experience. Also,
the aforementioned studies provide a methodolo-
gical framework for the study of autobiographical
memory bias in other disorders than PTSD. The
present study aimed to extend theory of self and
memory (e.g., SMS model; Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000) to the field of social anxiety. Specif-
ically, this study assessed the association between
goals, self-defining memories, and other autobio-
graphical memories in relation to high and low
levels of social anxiety.
This is important for two reasons. From a clinical
perspective it is important to know whether or not
autobiographical memory bias could play a role in
social anxiety in order to better understand the
disorder. From a theoretical perspective it is
important to empirically ascertain that, in abnor-
mal cognition, the relation between the self and
autobiographical memory as proposed in the SMS
model (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) is not
restricted to PTSD, which by definition revolves
around an autobiographical event.
Based on the SMS model (Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000) we hypothesised that participants
with high levels of social anxiety, compared to low
socially anxious participants, would report more
self-defining memories, more goals, and more
autobiographical memories related to social anxi-
ety. Further, we hypothesised that social anxiety-
related goals and self-discrepancy would predict
social anxiety-related autobiographical memory
bias above levels of social anxiety.
METHOD
Participants
All participants were students at the Radboud
University Nijmegen. Only individuals with high
and low levels of social anxiety participated in
the study. Social anxiety was measured with the
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Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS; Liebowitz,
1987). First, the LSAS was completed as an online
survey through the university’s online participant
system or was e-mailed to students who stated
their interest in participating in the study during
active on-campus recruitment. Second, partici-
pants with high and low social anxiety according
to their LSAS scores were invited to participate.
Based on earlier research using extreme groups
within student samples (e.g., Lange et al., 2011),
participants were classified as having high levels
of social anxiety (high SA) with an LSAS score
of 27 or higher, and low levels of anxiety
(low SA) with an LSAS score of 13 or lower on
the fear scale. In total 19 high socially anxious
(SA) and 29 low SA participants were included
in this study. Participants received course credit
or a €10 gift voucher as reimbursement for
their time.
Measures
Psychopathology. Social anxiety levels were
assessed with the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale
(LSAS; Liebowitz, 1987). This self-report ques-
tionnaire contains 24 items that describe social
behaviours (e.g., “telephoning in public”). Each
behaviour is rated on how much anxiety it pro-
vokes on a 4-point scale (0 = none to 3 = severe)
and how often the behaviour is avoided on a
4-point scale (0 = never to 3 = usually). The
internal consistency of the LSAS is high (α = 0.96)
and it shows good convergent validity and reason-
able discriminant validity (Heimberg et al., 1999).
Depression was measured with the Beck Depres-
sion Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown,
1996). This is a 21-item self-report questionnaire
with high test–retest reliability and internal con-
sistency are high (r = 0.93; Beck, Steer, & Brown,
1996; α = .91; Beck, Steer, Ball, & Ranieri, 1996).
Autobiographical memory cueing task. The
autobiographical memory cueing task (AMT) is
used to investigate memory bias in memory speci-
ficity (whether the memory was related to a
specific event, an extended event occurring over
several days, or a repeated event), or content, or
both (Williams & Broadbent, 1986). As in Suther-
land and Bryant (2008), five negative (hurt, tense,
angry, fear, and stress) and five positive (happy,
brave, safe, love, and special) cue words were used.
Before the actual AMT, participants practised
recalling specific autobiographical memories
in response to two practice words (egg and
chocolate). Participants were instructed to recall a
specific memory in response to each of the cue
words. The cue words were presented on cards by
the experimenter in random order with the re-
striction that negative and positive words
alternated.
The AMT is traditionally used to assess memory
specificity and therefore participants are prompted
to provide a specific memory (i.e., an event that
occurred on one particular day) if they fail to do so
on their first attempt. In the present study memory
specificity was not the target of investigation.
However, in order to remain methodologically
consistent with previous studies participants were
encouraged to provide a specific memory in the
present study. The AMT responses were coded for
content (social anxiety-related or not) and valence
(negative, positive, ambivalent, or neutral) by two
independent raters (JK and JdB) who were blind
to group.
Self-defining memories. Participants were asked
by the experimenter to recall five memories that
are emotional, important, and have a strong
relation to who they are as a person today (for
literal instructions see Sutherland & Bryant, 2005).
The responses were audio-recorded and tran-
scribed. Similar to the AMT, the memories were
coded for content (social anxiety-related or not)
and valence (negative, positive, or ambivalent).
Goals. Participants were asked to list 15 goals
that represent “the things that are most important
for you to achieve at this time” (Emmons, 1986;
Sutherland & Bryant, 2005). In Table 1 examples
are presented for social anxiety-related cued
autobiographical memories, self-defining memor-
ies and goals.
Self-discrepancy. To measure self-discrepancy, a
computerised version of the Self-Strength Guide
was used (Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997;
Holmes, Lang, & Shah, 2009). Participants gener-
ated six characteristics that they would ideally
like to possess (Ideal self) and six characteristics
that they believed they should possess (Ought
self). Participants rated the importance of each
characteristic as well as the extent to which they
felt they already possessed this characteristic.
Ideal–Actual self-discrepancy was defined as the
summed difference between the Actual self scores
and the Ideal self scores. Ought–Actual self-
discrepancy was defined as the summed difference
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between the Actual self scores and the Ought self
scores (Holmes et al., 2009).
Procedure
All measures were presented on a PC using
Inquisit 3 (Millisecond software), except the AMT
and self-defining memories, which were admin-
istered face-to-face by the experimenter. Partici-
pants first completed symptom severity measures
(BDI-II and LSAS) and then continued with the
AMT, self-defining memories, goal listing, and self-
discrepancy measure. The latter four tasks were
administered in random order for each participant.
Afterwards, participants were debriefed and thanked
for their participation.
RESULTS
Statistical approach
Group differences were tested using independent
samples t-tests. In cases of unequal variance the
corrected t-value is reported. Analyses were
regarded as significant where p < .05. Effect size
Cohen’s d is reported for all significant t-tests.
Means and standard deviations across and within
groups are reported in Table 2.
Inter-rater reliability
For the responses on the Autobiographical Memory
Task (AMT) the inter-rater reliability (Spearman
correlation) was rs = .806 (p < .001) for valence
TABLE 1
Examples of autobiographical memories on the AMT, self-defining memories, and goals that were coded as related to social anxiety
Autobiographical memories on the AMT Self-defining memories Goals
(cue word: stress)
The first time I met my supervisor I went there and
I thought “what is she expecting that I already
know?” and I was super stressed about that, that
maybe she would think I was stupid.
We had a sleep-over. It was kind of fun, but at some
point I shut down or something. That I suddenly
thought “I’m not fun”. That I just saw everyone
talking to each other and all I thought was “I can’t
do that”.
Be more confident
(cue word: brave)
Yesterday I went to the supermarket to buy
cigarettes; that was really hard.
I told on my brother and he and his friends sprayed
me with bug spray. Because they thought I am like a
mosquito: very skinny and very annoying.
Reduce the fear to fail
(cue word: hurt)
My friends were going on a holiday, but they did
not ask if I would come. That hurt me.
In high school, in second year, a teacher told me
“you can’t do this. You cannot do the A levels.”
Become more
assertive
TABLE 2
Descriptive statistics for the high and low socially anxious groups
High social anxiety Low social anxiety Total
M SD M SD M SD
Age 20.89 2.26 22.41 3.43 21.81 3.09
LSAS fear 35.16 7.10 7.00 3.64 18.15 14.86
LSAS avoidance 26.47 8.95 7.69 5.27 15.13 11.55
BDI-II 11.16 4.92 3.03 3.29 6.26 5.64
Number of negative memories on the AMT 5.26 0.81 4.31 1.00 4.69 1.03
Number of negative memories in response to positive cues on the AMT 1.68 1.06 1.45 0.87 1.54 0.94
Number of positive memories in response to negative cues on the AMT 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.63 0.25 0.53
Number of social anxiety-related memories on the AMT 2.47 1.65 0.41 0.68 1.23 1.53
Number of negative self-defining memories 2.89 1.14 1.76 0.95 2.21 1.67
Number of social anxiety-related self-defining memories 2.32 1.16 0.69 1.00 1.33 1.33
Number of social anxiety-related goals 3.37 1.89 1.28 1.13 2.10 1.79
Ideal–Actual self-discrepancy 8.58 3.04 4.86 2.23 6.33 3.14
Ought–Actual self-discrepancy 8.42 3.13 4.52 2.28 6.06 3.25
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and rs = .758 (p < .001) for content. For the self-
defining memories the inter-rater reliabilities were
rs = .907 (p < .001) and rs = .849 (p < .001), for
valence and content, respectively. Content inter-
rater reliability for current goals was rs = .815
(p < .001). Disagreements were resolved through
discussion and the agreed-upon scores were used
in the statistical analyses.
Demographic characteristics
There was no statistical difference in age between
the low SA and high SA groups, t(46) = 1.70, p =
.10, although there was a trend towards low SAs
being slightly older. The low SA group contained
five men and 24 women and the high SA group
contained two men and 17 women; χ2(1) = 0.42,
p = .52.
Group check
As expected, participants in the high SA group
had significantly higher scores on the fear subscale
of the LSAS than participants in the low SA
group, t(24.28) = 15.96, p < .001. Similarly, high
SA participants had significantly higher LSAS
avoidance scores than low SA participants,
t(26.24) = 8.26, p < .001. The high SA group also
showed higher levels of depression on the BDI-II
compared to the low SA group, t(46) = 6.86,
p < .001.
Memory recall bias
Autobiographical Memory Task. An independ-
ent samples t-test indicated that the high SA
group recalled more negative memories on the
AMT than the low SA group, t(46) = 3.47, p = .001,
d = 1.05.
We tested whether high SA participants also
recalled more negative memories in response to
positive cue words compared to low SAs. This was
not the case, t(46) = 0.84, p = .40. In contrast, low
SAs recalled more positive memories in response
to negative cue words than the high SA group,
t(28) = 3.55, p = .001, d = 1.30.
As predicted, high SAs recalled more memories
on the AMT that were related to social anxiety
compared to low SAs, t(22.10) = 5.17, p < .001,
d = 1.77.
Self-defining memories. An independent sam-
ples t-test indicated that high SAs recalled more
negative self-defining memories than the low SAs,
t(46) = 3.73, p = .001, d = 1.08. Also as predicted,
the high SA group on average reported more self-
defining memories related to social anxiety than
the low SA group, t(46) = 5.17, p < .001, d = 1.50.
Goals. An independent samples t-test indicated
that the high SA group reported more social
anxiety-related goals than low SA participants,
t(46) = 4.80, p < .001, d = 1.38. The number of
social anxiety-related goals was significantly corre-
lated with the LSAS fear subscale: r = .59, p <
.001; LSAS avoidance subscale: r = .51, p < .001,
BDI-II: r = .57, p < .001; number of social anxiety
memories on the AMT: r = .32, p = .03; number of
negative self-defining memories: r = .51, p < .001;
and number of social anxiety self-defining mem-
ories: r = .41, p = .004. Social anxiety-related
goals were only correlated at trend level with the
number of negative memories recalled on the
AMT: r = .26, p = .08.
Self-discrepancy. High SAs showed greater
Ideal–Actual self-discrepancy and Ought–Actual
self-discrepancy compared to low SAs; t(46) =
4.88, p < .001, d = 1.41, and t(46) = 5.00, p < .001,
d = 1.44, respectively.
Ideal–Actual self-discrepancy was significantly
and positively correlated with LSAS fear subscale:
r = .67, p < .001; LSAS avoidance subscale:
r = .66, p < .001, BDI-II: r = .67, p < .001; number
of negative memories on the AMT: r = .36, p = .01;
number of social anxiety-related memories on the
AMT: r = .52, p < .001; and number of social
anxiety-related self-defining memories: r = .46, p =
.001. Ideal–Actual self-discrepancy was only mar-
ginally significantly correlated with the number of
negative self-defining memories: r = .28, p = .06.
Ought–Actual self-discrepancy was significantly
and positively correlated with LSAS fear subscale:
r = .68, p < .001; LSAS avoidance subscale: r = .61,
p < .001; depression on the BDI-II: r = .76,
p < .001; number of negative memories on the
AMT: r = .49, p < .001; number of social anxiety-
related memories on the AMT: r = .55, p < .001;
and number of social anxiety-related self-defining
memories: r = .44, p < .001. Ought–Actual self-
discrepancy was only marginally correlated with
the number of negative self-defining memories:
r = .28, p = .06.
Predictors of social anxiety-related memory
recall. To test which variables were predictive of
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the number of social anxiety-related memories
recalled on the AMT, a hierarchical linear regres-
sion analysis was conducted with Step 1 including
LSAS fear, LSAS avoidance, and BDI-II scores;
Step 2 including the self-discrepancy scores; and
Step 3 including social anxiety-related goals. Only
the first model (including LSAS fear, LSAS
avoidance, and BDI-II scores) showed significant
predictive value, R2change = 0.53, Fchange (3, 44) =
16.84, p < .001. Within this block, only LSAS fear
reached significance as an independent predictor,
β = .51, t = 2.10, p = .04.
To test which variables were predictive of the
number of social anxiety-related self-defining
memories, a similar regression analysis was done
with the number of social anxiety self-defining
memories as the dependent variable. Again, only
the first model (LSAS fear, LSAS avoidance,
BDI-II) showed significant predictive value,
R2change = 0.38, Fchange (3, 44) = 9.02, p < .001.
Within this block, only LSAS fear was a significant
predictor, β = .62, t = 2.14, p = .04.
DISCUSSION
In line with predictions, participants high in social
anxiety recalled more negative memories and
more memories related to social anxiety than the
low socially anxious group on the AMT. Unlike
the findings in PTSD patients by Sutherland and
Bryant (2008), high socially anxious participants
did not recall more negative memories in response
to positive cue words than low socially anxious
participants. Rather, low socially anxious partici-
pants recalled more positive memories in response
to negative cue words. It is possible that students
who enjoy minimal social anxiety have fewer
negative experiences to draw on, and conse-
quently tend to retrieve positive memories in
response to cues that one might normally expect
to elicit a negative recollection.
As predicted, the high socially anxious partici-
pants reported more negative self-defining mem-
ories, and more self-defining memories related to
social anxiety compared to the low socially
anxious participants. That is, the socially anxious
participants incorporated negative social experi-
ences into their identity to a higher degree than
the low socially anxious participants. This mirrors
the findings in PTSD (Sutherland & Bryant, 2008)
and complicated grief (Maccallum & Bryant,
2010). The findings support the Self-Memory
System model of autobiographical memory (SMS
model; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) in which
a dynamic and bidirectional relation between the
self and memory retrieval is described. That is, an
individual with PTSD is more likely to report
trauma-related experiences when asked to recall
memories that are relevant to their identity.
Similarly, the findings of the present study show
that socially anxious individuals recall more mem-
ories related to socially anxious experiences when
asked to define themselves than do individuals
with lower levels of social anxiety.
Our prediction that participants high in social
anxiety would report more current goals related to
their social anxiety than the low socially anxious
participants was also supported. According to the
SMS model (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000),
the working self interacts between the long-term
self and autobiographical memory through cur-
rently held goals. That is, memories related to
current pursuits are thought to be highly access-
ible, which was underscored by our findings. As
would be expected from an interactive relationship
between the self, memory and current goals, all
measures were significantly and positively related
to the level of social anxiety symptoms. However,
in contrast to the Sutherland and Bryant (2005)
study, social anxiety-related goals did not predict
the retrieval of social anxiety-related autobio-
graphical memories (on the AMT or the self-
defining memories task) over current levels of
social anxiety, which was the only significant
predictor in a regression analysis.
As predicted, self-discrepancy (Actual and
Ought) was significantly greater in the high
socially anxious group and was positively and
significantly correlated with the recall of social
anxiety-related autobiographical memories on the
AMT as well as for social anxiety-related self-
defining memories. Similar to the goals, however,
self-discrepancy did not predict social anxiety-
related recall over current levels of social anxiety.
These findings are different from the pattern
found in the sample of PTSD patients (Sutherland
& Bryant, 2005, 2008), in which goals and self-
discrepancy were significant predictors of trauma-
related recall over symptoms levels of PTSD.
Several explanations may exist for this difference.
Whereas we studied students with varying levels
of social anxiety, Sutherland and Bryant (2005)
studied treatment-seeking patients diagnosed with
PTSD. It is also possible that the dominant effect
of trauma on people who develop PTSD may be
stronger than the influence of social concerns on
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people who experience social anxiety. Further,
traumatised individuals may have a more concrete
striving in relation to self-discrepancy as they can
compare their “pre-trauma” self to a “post-
trauma” self. In social anxiety, personal strivings
may be of a more global nature (e.g., “more
confident”) and may not have a concrete example
of a better self. The idea that goals exist in the
working self at different levels of abstractness/
concreteness has been previously put forward
within the SMS model (Conway, Meares, &
Standart, 2010). Further, goal specificity is related
to goal commitment (e.g., Wright & Kacmar,
1994) which could indicate that the working self
would have a more important role in PTSD than
in social anxiety.
Research has now shown that autobiographical
memory bias is present in PTSD (Sutherland &
Bryant, 2005, 2008), complicated grief (Maccallum
& Bryant, 2008, 2010), and social anxiety (this
paper). These participants also tended to view
their “self” in light of their disorder. This suggests
that the relation between the self and autobio-
graphical memory should be taken into account as
a trans-diagnostic factor, i.e., a factor that has
clinical significance across multiple disorders. For
clinical purposes, it seems warranted to assess
autobiographical memory bias and self-image as
meaningful variables in PTSD, complicated grief,
and social anxiety that should change over the
course of successful treatment. The research find-
ings further suggest that memory bias and negative
self-image could be important targets in psycholo-
gical treatment regardless of, but with considera-
tion for, the specific disorder.
This study has several limitations. For one, the
different tasks might have had a carry-over effect
that was not accounted for by counterbalancing
the measures. We decided to administer the tasks
in one session in order to be better able to relate
our results to the Sutherland and Bryant studies
(2005, 2008). Nevertheless, future studies should
consider administering the measures in different
sessions if possible. Second, the sample size was
rather small, but we also note here that effect sizes
for group differences were large. Third, the low
socially anxious group may have characteristics
that differ from the average because they repres-
ent an extreme group. Similarly, the high social
anxiety group were not administered a structured
clinical interview to determine Social Anxiety
Disorder. We chose to compare a high and low
socially anxious group based on the typical pro-
cedure of earlier studies that included non-clinical
samples (e.g., Lange et al., 2011). It is therefore
important to view the group differences in this
study as relative differences. Finally, the design of
the study is correlational in nature and therefore
provides no information about potential causal
relationships. The question remains whether mem-
ory influences the self in the same way that the self
is related to memory in social anxiety. Future
studies using experimental design can shed more
light on this question of causality.
To summarise, we tested whether the relation
between the self and autobiographical memory bias
in PTSD and complicated grief could also be found
in social anxiety. We found evidence for a similar
relation where high socially anxious participants
incorporated memories of socially anxious events
into their identity. The findings supported an
autobiographical memory bias towards socially
anxious memories in the high anxious group. The
findings of this study extend the Self-Memory System
model of autobiographical memory (Conway &
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) into the field of social
anxiety. The findings also contribute to emerging
literature supporting the notion that memory bias
in social anxiety may be particularly relevant in
the domain of autobiographical memory (Clark &
Wells, 1995; Morgan, 2010; Rapee & Heimberg,
1997). Finally, future studies that administer the
tasks at different sessions and studies using experi-
mental designs to uncover the causal mechanisms
behind the relationship between memory and the
self in social anxiety are necessary.
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